On Contractual Approach in Competitive Economies with Constrained Coalitional Structures

Результат исследования: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийстатья в сборнике материалов конференциинаучнаярецензирование

Аннотация

We establish a theorem that equilibria in an exchange economy can be described as allocations that are stable under the possibilities: (i) agents can partially and asymmetrically break current contracts, after that (ii) a new mutually beneficial contract can be concluded in a coalition of a size not more than 1 plus the maximum number of products that are not indifferent to the coalition members. The presented result generalizes previous ones on a Pareto improvement in an exchange economy with l commodities that requires the active participation of no more than traders. This concerned with Pareto optimal allocations, but we also describe equilibria. Thus according to the contractual approach to arrive at equilibrium only coalitions of constrained size can be applied that essentially raise the confidence of contractual modeling.

Язык оригиналаанглийский
Название основной публикацииMathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 19th International Conference, MOTOR 2020, Revised Selected Papers
РедакторыYury Kochetov, Igor Bykadorov, Tatiana Gruzdeva
ИздательSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Страницы244-255
Число страниц12
ISBN (печатное издание)9783030586560
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - июл 2020
Событие19th International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research,MOTOR 2020 - Novosibirsk, Российская Федерация
Продолжительность: 6 июл 202010 июл 2020

Серия публикаций

НазваниеCommunications in Computer and Information Science
Том1275 CCIS
ISSN (печатное издание)1865-0929
ISSN (электронное издание)1865-0937

Конференция

Конференция19th International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research,MOTOR 2020
СтранаРоссийская Федерация
ГородNovosibirsk
Период06.07.202010.07.2020

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