Bertrand meets ford: Benefits and losses

Alexander Sidorov, Mathieu Parenti, Jacques Francois Thisse

Результат исследования: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференцийглава/разделнаучнаярецензирование

2 Цитирования (Scopus)


The paper carries out the detailed comparison of two types of imperfect competition in a general equilibrium model. The price-taking Bertrand competition assumes the myopic income-taking behavior of firms, another type of behavior, price competition under a Ford effect, implies that the firms’ strategic choice takes into account their impact to consumers’ income. Our findings suggest that firms under the Ford effect gather more market power (measured by Lerner index), than “myopic” firms, which is agreed with the folk wisdom “Knowledge is power.” Another folk wisdom implies that increasing of the firms’ market power leads to diminishing in consumers’ well-being (measured by indirect utility.) We show that in general this is not true. We also obtain the sufficient conditions on the representative consumer preference providing the “intuitive” behavior of the indirect utility and show that this condition satisfy the classes of utility functions, which are commonly used as examples (e.g., CES, CARA and HARA).

Язык оригиналаанглийский
Название основной публикацииStatic and Dynamic Game Theory
Подзаголовок основной публикацииFoundations and Applications
ИздательBirkhauser Verlag Basel
Число страниц18
СостояниеОпубликовано - 1 янв 2018

Серия публикаций

НазваниеStatic and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
ISSN (печатное издание)2363-8516
ISSN (электронное издание)2363-8524


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