This paper continues the research work , which generalizes the well-known Bondareva–Shapleytheorem to the case of fuzzy cooperative n-player games. Theconditions of V-balancedness are studied for three classes of fuzzygames as follows: 1) fuzzy transferable utility (TU) market games ; 2) fuzzy games associated with the linear-productionmodels ; 3) fuzzy games generated by therational distribution models of public costs during the construction of transport infrastructurefacilities (the so-called airport games ). Inaddition to the conditions guaranteeing the non-emptiness of the cores, some types ofnon-dominated imputations of these games are also described. For the fuzzy airport games, such adescription is exhaustive.
Предметные области OECD FOS+WOS
- 2.02 ЭЛЕКТРОТЕХНИКА, ЭЛЕКТРОННАЯ ТЕХНИКА, ИНФОРМАЦИОННЫЕ ТЕХНОЛОГИИ
- 2.11 ПРОЧИЕ ТЕХНОЛОГИИ