Unblocked Imputations of Fuzzy Games. II: Nonemptiness of Cores of Two Market Games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider a generalization of the Scarf theorem on the nonemptiness of game cores to the case of fuzzy cooperative games without side payments. We consider applications of the generalized Scarf theorem to finding the nonemptiness conditions for fuzzy cores of two market games generated by the model of pure economic exchange and the spatial regional model.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)455-469
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Mathematical Sciences (United States)
Volume253
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2021

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Unblocked Imputations of Fuzzy Games. II: Nonemptiness of Cores of Two Market Games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this