Pyrrhonian skepticism and Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem

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The article compares the Pyrrhonian skepticism with the interpretations of Gödel's Second Theorem as a skeptical challenge in modern mathematics. It is shown that the epistemological framework of Gödel's restrictive theorems fits into the skeptical reflection scheme of Sextus Empiricus.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)551-560
Number of pages10
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2018


  • Consistency
  • Gödel
  • Intensionality
  • Isostheneia
  • Metamathematics
  • Second incompleteness theorem
  • Sextus Empiricus
  • consistency
  • isostheneia
  • intensionality
  • Godel
  • metamathematics

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