On Contractual Approach in Competitive Economies with Constrained Coalitional Structures

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Abstract

We establish a theorem that equilibria in an exchange economy can be described as allocations that are stable under the possibilities: (i) agents can partially and asymmetrically break current contracts, after that (ii) a new mutually beneficial contract can be concluded in a coalition of a size not more than 1 plus the maximum number of products that are not indifferent to the coalition members. The presented result generalizes previous ones on a Pareto improvement in an exchange economy with l commodities that requires the active participation of no more than traders. This concerned with Pareto optimal allocations, but we also describe equilibria. Thus according to the contractual approach to arrive at equilibrium only coalitions of constrained size can be applied that essentially raise the confidence of contractual modeling.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 19th International Conference, MOTOR 2020, Revised Selected Papers
EditorsYury Kochetov, Igor Bykadorov, Tatiana Gruzdeva
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Pages244-255
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9783030586560
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2020
Event19th International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research,MOTOR 2020 - Novosibirsk, Russian Federation
Duration: 6 Jul 202010 Jul 2020

Publication series

NameCommunications in Computer and Information Science
Volume1275 CCIS
ISSN (Print)1865-0929
ISSN (Electronic)1865-0937

Conference

Conference19th International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research,MOTOR 2020
CountryRussian Federation
CityNovosibirsk
Period06.07.202010.07.2020

Keywords

  • Coalitions of constrained size
  • Competitive equilibrium
  • Contractual economies
  • Fuzzy contractual allocations

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