Gradient Cryptanalysis of Block Cipher CHAM 64/128

Boris Ryabko, Alexander Soskov, Andrey Fionov

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We1 provide the results of cryptanalysis of the lightweight block cipher CHAM 64/128 carried out by means of a so-called gradient statistical attack. The experiments show that after 23 rounds the secret key can be determined with probability 0.01 under the length of the input sample 231 bytes and complexity 237 round function evaluations. Theoretical extrapolation of the suggested attack shows that the key can be completely determined with probability 0.01 after 57 rounds. The recommended number of rounds for CHAM 64/128 is 80. According to the cipher designers, the most successful attack has been a related-key boomerang attack which is effective on 56 rounds.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2019 16th International Symposium "Problems of Redundancy in Information and Control Systems", REDUNDANCY 2019
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages211-215
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9781728119441
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2019
Event16th International Symposium "Problems of Redundancy in Information and Control Systems", REDUNDANCY 2019 - Moscow, Russian Federation
Duration: 21 Oct 201925 Oct 2019

Publication series

Name2019 16th International Symposium "Problems of Redundancy in Information and Control Systems", REDUNDANCY 2019

Conference

Conference16th International Symposium "Problems of Redundancy in Information and Control Systems", REDUNDANCY 2019
CountryRussian Federation
CityMoscow
Period21.10.201925.10.2019

Keywords

  • block ciphers
  • cryptanalysis
  • Lightweight ciphers
  • statistical attack

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