Common root of the theory of testimonial religious knowledge and some skeptical arguments

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Abstract

The author discusses the mode of introduction of religious testimonial knowledge as a response to skepticism. It is argued that Professor Greco's Answer to The Argument from Peer Disagreement (Part Three; Application to the three skeptical arguments) requires accepting the thesis that has the same conceptual grounding as the skeptical statements about the impossibility to share any belief. Taking into account this common grounding, it is desirable to explain the statement "A major motivation for anti-skepticism about testimony is anti-skepticism in general" (Part Two). The theory of religious testimonial knowledge uses the statement, which can be grounded by accepting the Mental Holism. However, the Mental Holism is also a possible grounding for some skeptical theses. Thus, a philosopher who assumes religious testimonial knowledge takes not only an anti-skeptical position, but also can take a "proto-skeptical" position.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)48-57
Number of pages10
JournalEpistemology and Philosophy of Science
Volume53
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Keywords

  • Mental holism
  • Mental states
  • Narrow content
  • Shared beliefs
  • Skepticism
  • Testimonial knowledge
  • transmission of knowledge

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