An Analog of the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem. II. Examples of V-Balanced Fuzzy Games

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Abstract

This paper continues the research work [2], which generalizes the well-known Bondareva–Shapleytheorem to the case of fuzzy cooperative n-player games. Theconditions of V-balancedness are studied for three classes of fuzzygames as follows: 1) fuzzy transferable utility (TU) market games [3]; 2) fuzzy games associated with the linear-productionmodels [6]; 3) fuzzy games generated by therational distribution models of public costs during the construction of transport infrastructurefacilities (the so-called airport games [5]). Inaddition to the conditions guaranteeing the non-emptiness of the cores, some types ofnon-dominated imputations of these games are also described. For the fuzzy airport games, such adescription is exhaustive.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)364-374
Number of pages11
JournalAutomation and Remote Control
Volume82
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2021

Keywords

  • core of fuzzy cooperative game
  • fuzzy airport game
  • fuzzy cooperative game
  • fuzzy LP-game
  • fuzzy TU market game
  • V-balancedness

OECD FOS+WOS

  • 2.11.OA INSTRUMENTS & INSTRUMENTATION
  • 2.02.IQ ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC
  • 2.02.AC AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS

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