Проблема реальности объектов науки в полемике «реализм versus конструктивизм»: философско-методологический анализ

Translated title of the contribution: The problem of the reality of science objects in the polemics “realism versus constructivism”: Philosophical and methodological analysis

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Abstract

This paper aims to show that a methodological solution to the dispute “realism versus constructivism” can be found in the conception of Niels Bohr, which describes the specific features of the functioning of ideal and theoretical objects in the structure of a theory in terms of the principles of complementarity and inseparability. The subject of the dispute between realists and constructivists is the nature of theoretical objects that are part of a theory and are given in observation or experiment. At the same time, these objects are postulated and constructed by the theory. In this regard, there is a problem of the status of such theoretical objects: do they really exist, or are they theoretical constructions? Realism builds on the foundations of a naturalistic ontology and claims that the objects of scientific research exist in the nature itself qua “something” prior to the act of cognition. Hence the methodological premise of realism about the possibility of empirical fixation of objects and their subsequent study. This premise leads realists to the development of a methodology, which is secondary to the ontological solution of the problem of reality. Realists believe that the role of a theory is to describe the features of the objects that are given in an experiment. Unlike realists, adherents of constructivism believe that objects are constructed by a researcher in the process of scientific work. Constructivism develops various variants of social ontology in order to justify its position. The necessary theoretical tools for dealing with this problem are proposed in the conception of N. Bohr: the practical use of concepts (i.e. terms that refer to theoretical objects) stands in a supplementary relation to the attempts of their strict use (as terms that refer to ideal objects). Theoretical objects are given in empirical observation and experiment, which makes it impossible to fix the limits of applicability of theoretical terms denoting the objects of reality, since “everything flows” in the realm of the empirical. To solve this problem, the author introduces a layer of norms of word usage (for ideal objects), which are supplementary with respect to practical word usage, within which these boundaries are strictly fixed.

Translated title of the contributionThe problem of the reality of science objects in the polemics “realism versus constructivism”: Philosophical and methodological analysis
Original languageRussian
Article number9
Pages (from-to)126-139
Number of pages14
JournalFilosofskii Zhurnal
Volume12
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2019

Keywords

  • Constructivism
  • Epistemology
  • Methodology
  • Ontology
  • Realism
  • The natural being of the object of science
  • The social being of the object of science
  • the social being of the object of science
  • the natural being of the object of science
  • realism
  • epistemology
  • constructivism
  • ontology
  • methodology

OECD FOS+WOS

  • 6.05 OTHER HUMANITIES
  • 6.03 PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS AND RELIGION

State classification of scientific and technological information

  • 02 PHILOSOPHY

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